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Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Belarus: 
Analysis and Recommendations 
 
Summary 
This paper describes and evaluates the current monetary and exchange rate policy of 
the National Bank of Belarus. After a short description (Part 1), an assessment of the 
National Bank's policy is provided by means of raising and answering three questions. 
First, we ask whether the current focus on external (i.e. exchange rate) rather than 
on internal (i.e. price) stability is appropriate (Part 2). Several arguments are pre-
sented in support of the existing focus on external stability. Second, the question on 
the right implementation of external stability is raised (Part 3). Instead of the current 
practice of targeting the US Dollar, we recommend to target a currency basket con-
sisting of three currencies: Russian Ruble, US Dollar and Euro. Besides, we agree in 
principle with the usage of a crawling band, but the public should be informed more 
accurately about it. Finally, we examine whether the current level of the exchange 
rate is suitable (Part 4). Devaluation will only become necessary, if the government 
fails to improve the investment climate and to attract foreign capital as a source of 
current account deficit financing. 
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1. The current monetary and exchange rate policy in Belarus 
According to article 25 of the Banking Code, the goal of the National Bank of Belarus 
(hereafter: NBB) is to ensure the stability of the Belarusian Ruble, including both its 
purchasing power and the exchange rate to other currencies. In the long term, i.e. pe-
riods of more than five years, these objectives can be considered as complementary.1 
However, a key insight from economic theory and practice is that it is usually not pos-
sible to simultaneously satisfy these objectives in the short term. The coexistence of 
multiple objectives may become a source of policy conflict, which has to be avoided by 
setting a clear hierarchy of priorities. Consequently, the NBB has to make the funda-
mental decision, whether its policy should be focused on reaching internal (i.e. price) 
or external (i.e. exchange rate) stability. The NBB chose for the time being to concen-
trate on external stability. 
Chart 1. Exchange rate of the Belarusian Ruble 
to the US Dollar and the Russian Ruble 
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Source: National Bank of Belarus. 
Note: December 2002 = 100. 
The concrete implementation of this fundamental decision can be described using 
Chart 1. The development of the BYR/USD exchange rate is very smooth and espe-
cially much smoother than the BYR/RUB exchange rate. This clearly indicates that the 
Belarusian Ruble is pegged to the US Dollar (and not to the Russian Ruble). Further-
more, one can see that the BYR/USD rate is not constant over time. Thus, we are 
dealing with a crawling peg to the US Dollar. Besides, the rate of devaluation is not 
constant over time. While in 2003 the Belarusian Ruble depreciated at a monthly rate 
of 1% vis-à-vis the US Dollar, the exchange rate has practically remained unchanged 
since the start of 2004. Apparently, the devaluation rate can be adjusted on short no-
tice, if the monetary authorities consider this to be justified. As is usual the case with 
crawling pegs, a band exists within which the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate. 
This band seems to be rather tight. Since 2004 the observed fluctuations around the 
central parity did not surpass 1%. To sum up, a crawling band based on the US Dollar 
seems to be in place. But this crawling band seems to be rather flexible in the sense 
that the devaluation rate can be adjusted on short notice. Furthermore, the existence 
of this crawling band has not been communicated to the public in an explicit manner.2 
                                       
1 This view is empirically supported by the fact that economies with a focus on internal stability, i.e. a low rate of 
inflation, normally exhibit also a high degree of external, i.e. exchange rate, stability in the long-term. Vice versa, 
countries with chronically high rates of inflation tend to have weak currencies. 
2 De jure (as stated in the Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2004), the NBB targets the Russian ruble according to a 
smooth path of devaluation with a fluctuation band of 4–5%. The chart makes clear that this guideline has not been 
followed in 2004, as the Belarusian Ruble has revalued vis-à-vis the Russian Ruble. 
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After this short description of the current monetary and exchange rate policy, we 
move on to evaluate the policy of the NBB on the basis of the following three key 
questions: 
Question 1: Is the NBB right to focus on external (i.e. exchange rate) stability or 
should it consider a strategic shift towards internal (i.e. price) stability? Part 2 ad-
dresses the fundamental choice between internal and external stability. 
Question 2: Is the current implementation (definition) of the external stability appro-
priate? In Part 3 we discuss alternative exchange rate policies. 
Question 3: Does the NBB target the proper level of the exchange rate? Part 4 exam-
ines whether a depreciation of the national currency is necessary to achieve an exter-
nal equilibrium. 
2. Should the focus be on internal or external stability? 
As described above, the NBB faces the fundamental choice between the objectives of 
internal and external stability. For Belarus, we recommend that external stability 
should be the predominant objective of the NBB, which is in line with its actual policy. 
It follows then that the internal stability objective has to be subordinated to this ob-
jective. Our recommendation is based on two arguments in favor of external stability 
(2.1) as well as on two arguments against internal stability (2.2) as the predominant 
objective. 
2.1. Arguments in favor of external stability as the predominant objective 
Fixed exchange rates and disinflation 
Many emerging markets that have suffered chronically from very high or even hyper-
inflation have adopted a fixed exchange regime in the hope of rapidly reducing their 
rate of inflation. General arguments in favor of pursuing fast disinflation are better al-
locative efficiency and signaling effect of prices. 
Fixing the value of the own currency to that of a more stable currency, which is ex-
actly what an exchange-rate peg involves, provides a stable and credible nominal an-
chor for the economy that has several important benefits. First, the exchange-rate 
peg fixes the inflation rate for internationally traded goods, and thus directly contrib-
utes to keeping inflation under control. Second, a credible exchange rate peg will also 
reduce domestic inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor country. The 
lower inflation expectations will then bring the domestic inflation rate in line with that 
of the stable anchor country relatively quickly. Finally, an exchange rate peg may be 
more transparent than an internal policy target (e.g. monetary and credit aggregates 
or the inflation rate). The simplicity and clarity of a peg that is easily understood by 
the public enhances the credibility of such a policy target. 
However, an exchange-rate peg has certain implications for domestic policymakers. 
The regime is inherently fragile, because an attack on a pegged exchange rate can 
force the abandonment of the peg by stripping away the country’s foreign reserves. 
Policymakers must therefore be able to convince the public that they are willing and 
able to defend the fixed exchange rate. The commitment to a pegged exchange rate is 
implicitly a commitment to monetary and fiscal stability, without which a fixed ex-
change rate cannot be sustained. 
High level of foreign trade 
The Belarusian economy shows a high degree of openness to foreign trade (Chart 2). 
In this context, the generally cited advantages of fixed exchange rates are the elimi-
nation of exchange rate risk that should stimulate increased trade and investment. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes provide greater certainty for exporters and importers 
and can exert a strong discipline on domestic firms and employees to keep their pro-
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duction costs under control in order to remain competitive in international goods mar-
kets. This argument is especially important for an open economy such as Belarus. 
Chart 2. Openness of the Belarusian economy 
(merchandise trade turnover in % of GDP) 
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Source: calculations based on data of the NBB and the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
Another potential benefit of a fixed exchange rate regime is that by providing a stable 
foreign value of the currency, this might lower risk for international investors and thus 
encourage capital inflows, which could stimulate growth. Thus, to the extent that a 
pegged exchange rate reduces the profit uncertainty associated with exchange rate 
volatility, it encourages investment and growth. 
2.2. Arguments against internal stability as the predominant objective 
Problems with the indicator of internal stability 
A strategy based on the achievement of internal stability presupposes the selection of 
a relevant indicator as the measure of internal stability. Usually the inflation rate, as 
measured by a consumer price index (CPI), serves as an indicator of internal stability. 
Having transition countries like Belarus in mind, two caveats have to be added here. 
First, inflation data, and in particular consumer price inflation data, may be subject to 
measurement errors and may exhibit an upward bias. Due to a dramatic increase in 
the number of new products and the improving quality of existing products this bias 
can be substantial in transition countries. Second, an important factor affecting the 
controllability of inflation that is especially relevant in a transition country context is 
the high share of government-administered prices (mainly public utility and fuel 
prices) in the index, especially when some of these prices have some form of back-
ward looking indexation. This constraint restricts the share of “free prices” which 
monetary policy can influence while adding significant persistence to the inflation rate. 
Both arguments given above imply that the inflation rate as an indicator of internal 
stability is both unreliable and less than perfect to control. This supports the focus on 
external stability further. 
Lack of prerequisites for domestic strategies (inflation/monetary targeting) 
Apart from the discussion of the availability of an appropriate indicator of internal sta-
bility, there can be other reasons why targeting the internal stability of the currency 
might possibly fail. The two most prominent strategies that use domestic nominal an-
chors are monetary targeting and inflation targeting. 
Monetary targeting is aimed at controlling an established intermediate target, a mone-
tary aggregate, in order to achieve the final goal of low and stable inflation. The pre-
conditions for the successful introduction of monetary targeting are empirically stable 
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relationships between money and inflation (i.e. a stable demand for money that re-
sults in a stable or at least predictable development of its velocity) and the ability to 
control the broad money supply by the central bank (i.e. a stable money multiplier). 
When money demand is subject to large random shocks and velocity is unstable, or 
when shocks to the money multiplier weaken the control of the money supply by the 
central bank, the effectiveness of monetary targeting is considerably reduced. Indeed, 
in transition countries such as Belarus, there is often a lack of such stable relation-
ships, or the shortage of historical data makes it impossible to identify reliable ones, 
therefore this strategy is rarely applied. 
The other variant of a domestic monetary policy strategy is inflation targeting. Here, 
the central bank targets the final objective of monetary policy, a low rate of inflation, 
directly without the use of intermediate targets. This strategy gained importance in a 
number of industrialized countries, and recently also in several emerging markets. In 
the context of Belarus, direct inflation targeting is fraught with the difficulty of meas-
uring, forecasting, and controlling inflation, and a lack of knowledge about the rela-
tionship between the instruments (e.g. policy rates) and the final objective. Moreover, 
as in the case of monetary targeting, when monetary policy is forced to respond to 
domestic economic shocks this strategy carries the risk of large swings in the ex-
change rate, at least in the short term. Thus, neither monetary nor inflation targeting 
look attractive to Belarus for the time being. 
Conclusion 1: Given Belarus' current stage in the transformation process, the main 
focus of its monetary and exchange rate policy should be external (i.e. exchange rate) 
rather than internal (i.e. price) stability. We consequently support the NBB's decision 
to concentrate on external stability. 
3. How should the goal of external stability be implemented? 
For the practical conduct of monetary policy, the goal of external stability must be im-
plemented. In particular, the NBB has to decide on the anchor currency (3.1), the de-
velopment of the central parity over time and the allowed fluctuations around it (3.2), 
and the communication with the public (3.3). 
3.1. Choice of anchor currency 
A useful starting point regarding the choice of an appropriate anchor currency is the 
inspection of Belarus’ bilateral trade with selected trading partners. Chart 3 presents 
evidence of the strong economic ties between Belarus and Russia. As measured by 
trade flows, both economies are highly integrated and the Russian Ruble is therefore a 
likely candidate as an anchor currency. However, there are two major objections why 
the adoption of a ruble-peg might not be recommendable for Belarus. First, it is not 
clear to what extent Belarus and Russia form an optimal currency area. This term re-
fers to the likely impact of macroeconomic shocks on the economies involved. An op-
timal currency area exhibits a symmetric response to shocks, or there are other 
mechanisms at work (i.e. factor mobility) that help to cushion any asymmetric im-
pacts. In such cases, the exchange rate can be fixed since it is redundant as a policy 
instrument. Having this in mind, if we look at the external sectors of Belarus and Rus-
sia, it becomes obvious that both economies exhibit a very different energy position. 
External shocks such as higher energy (oil and gas) prices will affect both countries 
asymmetrically, and ask for different exchange rate reactions. In case of an energy 
price increase, this will improve the external position of Russia, and induce an appre-
ciation of the Russian Ruble. Conversely, Belarus as a major energy importer will face 
a worsening of its external position that requires a depreciation of its currency in or-
der to restore external equilibrium. In such a situation, a fixed exchange rate ar-
rangement is clearly inferior to a flexible one, because the latter can play an insulating 
role in the presence of external shocks. Second, there are doubts whether the Russian 
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Ruble exhibits the important feature of a credible anchor currency, at least at the 
moment. As stated in Part 2, a major benefit of an exchange rate peg is the adoption 
of the low rate of inflation in the anchor country. Here, doubts are justified whether 
Russia can play this stabilizing role, keeping in mind its more recent history of high 
inflation and a current rate of inflation that is still high by international standards. 
Chart 3. Shares of bilateral trade with Russia, 
USA, and the EU in total trade (2003) 
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Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
A further candidate as an anchor currency is the US Dollar, which is the predominant 
international reserve currency and undoubtedly fulfills the goal of a credible anchor 
currency. This is in the context of Belarus visible in its widespread use in informal 
transactions and as a store of value (i.e. a high degree of dollarization) in the econ-
omy. However, as chart 3 shows, the level of trade with the United States is ex-
tremely low, even though the amount of US dollar-denominated trade is much larger 
than shown, as main import goods (i.e. oil and gas) are quoted in US Dollar. Hence, 
we do not advocate a peg to the US Dollar, as the level of trade denominated in this 
currency is insufficient. 
A third candidate as an anchor currency is the Euro, which shares several features 
with the US Dollar with respect to its use as a possible nominal anchor and means of 
payment in international trade. This currency can also be characterized as a credible 
anchor currency (as witnessed by the low and stable inflation rate in the countries of 
the Euro-zone) whose importance as an international reserve currency is slowly in-
creasing. However, as in the case of the US Dollar, this positive feature is not backed 
by a sufficient trade volume with the Euro-zone, as can be seen in chart 3. Therefore, 
we do not recommend a Euro-peg at the moment. This situation might change, how-
ever, with the enlargement of the European Monetary Union and the introduction of 
the Euro to the 10 new member states. In the future, we expect Belarus’ trade struc-
ture to be more heavily weighted towards the Euro than it is right now. 
To sum up, the above analysis shows no clear preference for either of the currencies 
Russian Ruble, US Dollar, and Euro as an anchor currency. In this situation, we rec-
ommend the adoption of a peg to a basket of currencies, rather than to a single cur-
rency. When the exchange rate peg is to a single currency, fluctuations in the anchor 
currency against other major currencies imply fluctuations in the exchange rate of the 
Belarusian Ruble against those major currencies. By pegging to a currency basket in-
stead, Belarus can reduce the vulnerability of its economy to fluctuations in the values 
of the currencies in the basket, i.e. is less affected by individual shocks to bilateral ex-
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change rates. A fact that further supports the adoption of a currency basket is the 
relatively minor importance of capital account transaction for Belarus, and the associ-
ated low level of external debt. In situations where international capital flows are 
large, and a significant portion of the country’s debt is denominated in a foreign cur-
rency, this might influence the choice towards a peg to a single currency. 
As regards the composition of the basket, due to the current and likely future impor-
tance of the three currencies discussed, we recommend a basket consisting of Russian 
Ruble, US Dollar, and Euro. The share of the individual currencies in the basket should 
mainly reflect the relative importance of the currency for Belarus (now and in the fu-
ture). Given the predominant role of trade with Russia, the share of the Russian ruble 
should be at least as high as the share of the US Dollar and of the Euro. Furthermore, 
the shares of the US Dollar and Euro in the basket should be roughly the same. This 
can be justified by the continuing widespread circulation of the US Dollar in Belarus, 
and a possible increase in the amount of trade with members of the Euro-zone after 
the enlargement of European Monetary Union. As a result, the basket should have one 
the following two structures: 50% Russian Ruble, 25% US Dollar and 25% Euro; or 
alternatively 1/3 each. 
Conclusion 2: We recommend to peg the Belarusian Ruble to a basket of currencies 
including the Russian Ruble, the US Dollar, and the Euro, instead of the current tar-
geting of the US Dollar. 
3.2. The fluctuation band and the development of the central parity 
The flexibility and degree of monetary policy discretion of a fixed exchange rate sys-
tem can be increased by placing a fluctuation band around the central parity rate, in 
which the exchange rate is allowed to be determined freely by market forces. Such a 
band may be necessary for dealing with short-term shocks, for example sudden 
changes in prices for exports and imports. In such cases, due to the band, the nomi-
nal exchange rate can absorb all or at least most of the pressure without loosing its 
anchoring role for the economy. Especially in view of the very low level of foreign ex-
change reserves in Belarus, this feature favors the introduction of a band rather than 
a simple peg, where the central bank is forced to intervene immediately upon devia-
tion of the exchange rate from its parity. The extent to which the exchange rate is al-
lowed to fluctuate within the band has also important implications on the perception of 
exchange rate risk from the side of the public. 
The obvious question that arises in designing such a band system is how wide the 
band should be. Unfortunately, there are no economic studies that yield clear quanti-
tative estimates of the desirable band width. Countries that have operated band sys-
tems have, with some exceptions, usually used widths in the range of up to ±10%. 
A further crucial issue is, whether this central parity should be constant (horizontal 
band), or whether it should be adjusted (i.e. devalued) over time (crawling band). A 
horizontal band is not advisable for Belarus, since this would imply an ongoing real ap-
preciation of the national currency, given the prevailing high inflation differentials to po-
tential countries with anchor currencies (Chart 4). While there can be positive effects 
from a real appreciation (this keeps the price of imported goods such as oil and capital 
goods for the industry artificially low), there are also negative effects on external com-
petitiveness and the export sector, leading to a deterioration of the trade balance. 
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Chart 4. CPI spreads between Belarus and selected countries 
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Source: calculations based on data of the IFS, the ECB and the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
A crawling band is better suited to maintain the anchoring role for the nominal ex-
change rate, yet at the same time it limits adverse movements in the real exchange 
rate. A full specification of a crawling band regime requires the identification of the 
rate at which the band will crawl. Generally, the rate of crawl can be set in a regular 
backward-looking manner, in order to respond to past inflation differentials, or it can 
be set forward-looking, at a pre-announced rate that corresponds to expected inflation 
differentials. In both cases, the band then crawls each day in accordance with the 
specific formula chosen. 
Conclusion 3: In order to avoid a harmful real appreciation of the Belarusian Ruble 
and to retain the necessary flexibility, the exchange rate system should be established 
as a crawling band, with the rate of crawl determined by the inflation differentials vis-à-
vis the basket currencies and a fluctuation band around the central parity. We conse-
quently approve, at least in principle, the current use of a crawling band by the NBB. 
3.3. Announcement of the exchange rate policy 
The communicative strategy of the central bank is a core element of its policy. While 
the preceding sections discussed the principle features of a suitable exchange rate re-
gime for Belarus, the question remains how this policy should be announced to the 
public. From our point of view the main elements of the suggested crawling band sys-
tem should be disclosed and properly communicated. Information about the current 
and future stance of monetary policy is a major advantage for the public as it removes 
unnecessary uncertainty. This is especially the case for a transition country such as 
Belarus in times of permanent structural change. A communication strategy, which 
can be relied on, is an important anchor for private sector behavior and a guidepost to 
the future course of the economy. Consequently, the core elements of the suggested 
crawling band system (such as the composition of the currency basket the Belarusian 
Ruble is pegged to, the fluctuation band and the rate of crawl) should be announced 
and published. 
The proposed system still leaves the central bank the necessary flexibility to respond 
to short-run shocks to the economy, which is essential in times of structural change. 
In cases of negative shocks, the central bank has several opportunities to respond ef-
fectively to them within the framework of a crawling band system. A first line of de-
fense might consist of a widening of the fluctuation band, which may smooth adjust-
ment to the effects of the shock. Second, if the central parity or the rate of crawl is 
out of line with fundamentals, an appropriate modification of the rate of crawl, or a 
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one-time central parity change is advisable. Third, the composition of the currency 
basket could be altered if necessary. 
Conclusion 4: A strategy of disclosing the main elements of the exchange rate policy 
will strengthen the credibility of the central bank and improve the conduct of mone-
tary policy. 
4. Should the Belarusian Ruble be devalued? 
Current account deficits do not pose an economic problem for a country, as long as 
they are financed by regular and stable flows of foreign capital, preferably in the form 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Belarus managed in the past to finance significant 
deficits (USD 527 m or 3% of GDP in 2003) through rather large, but somewhat spo-
radic capital inflows. But given the considerable worsening in the investment climate 
and the standstill in the privatization process, it is questionable whether Belarus will 
be able to further finance a large current account deficit in the near future. Conse-
quently, Belarus is presently facing an external problem, which has to be solved. 
The easiest and best way to solve this problem is to attract foreign capital and espe-
cially FDI. For this, the investment climate must be improved significantly and the dis-
crimination of foreign enterprises in several sectors must be eliminated. Furthermore, 
the privatization process should be drastically speeded up. By pursuing such a policy, 
the government will crucially contribute in restoring external stability, and a devalua-
tion of the Belarusian Ruble will not be necessary. 
Should the government fail to improve the investment climate and to attract foreign 
investment, then the NBB has to consider other ways of how to restore external sta-
bility. The current account deficit could be financed by official reserves. But official re-
serves should only be used to finance temporary external problems, not structural 
ones. Besides, official reserves stood at a mere USD 660 m as of October 2004, which 
cover less than half a month of imports. This is significantly less than the recom-
mended minimum of three months of import coverage. Thus, the only way to restore 
external stability would be to eliminate the current account deficit. For this, the NBB 
would be forced to devalue the national currency. Given the financial dollarization in 
Belarus, devaluation would weaken the banking sector. Besides, it would negatively 
affect inflation. 
So, should the Belarusian Ruble be devalued? If the government manages to improve 
the investment climate and to attract foreign capital, then there is no need for de-
valuation. This would be by far the best way to restore external stability. But if the 
government fails to improve the situation, then the NBB will have to devalue the na-
tional currency. In such a case, the blame for the devaluation should not be put on 
the NBB, but on the government. 
Conclusion 5: In order to restore external stability, the government should signifi-
cantly improve the investment climate and attract foreign investment. A devaluation 
of the Belarusian Ruble will only be necessary and advisable, if the government fails 
to attract foreign capital as a source of current account deficit financing. 
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